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Putnam, James and “Absolute”
Truth
Henry Jackman
1 Contemporary Pragmatism is often understood as taking either a “subjectivist” form
(typically  associated  with  Richard  Rorty),  or  an  “objectivist”  form  (most  often
associated with Hilary Putnam).1 However, while most are happy to list C. S. Peirce as
the originator of  the comparatively objective form, William James’s  position in this
narrative is harder to place. 
2 This should not be surprising, since the division between these objective and subjective
versions of pragmatism tends to be most easily cashed out in terms of competing views
about the nature of truth, and James’s talk of truth is notoriously, and deliberately,
ambiguous. In particular, James takes our use of “truth” to pick out both “temporary”
(or “subjective,” “relative” or “half”) truth, and “absolute” (or “objective or “ultimate”)
truth.2 As he put it in his 1908 Harvard seminar:
It is unfortunate that truth should be used, now for the temporary beliefs of men
and  now  for  a  purely  abstract  thing  that  nobody  may,  perhaps,  ever  be  in
possession of. The pragmatist definition of truth applies to both. Since the word,
however, is the same, I wish someone here present might invent distinct words for
ultimate truth and temporary belief.3 
3 Roughly, a claim is “temporarily” true if we are warranted in asserting it at the time,
and “absolutely” true if it would continue to have such warrant even if inquiry were
extended  indefinitely.  Depending  on  what  sort  of  truth  you  focus  on,  James’s
pragmatism  will  seem  very  subjectivistic or  comparatively  objectivistic.  So,  for
instance, Rorty takes James to be primarily interested in temporary truth, with absolute
truth only serving as an unrealized (and possibly unrealizable) ideal that plays a role
similar to his own “cautionary” use of “true” – a mere reminder that the truths we take
to be warranted now may be rejected by us in the future.4 Putnam, by contrast, argues
for an objectivist reading of James, one where he takes absolute truth to be the primary
sense of the term.5 Putnam argues that the ideal of absolute truth isn’t merely regulative
for James, and that not only did James believe that some of our beliefs (such as his own
belief in the pragmatic theory of truth)6 actually were absolutely true: he also took the
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best explanation of why some of our beliefs were warranted (i.e.: “temporarily true”) to
be that they were absolutely true as well.7 
4 As against this  reading,  I’ll  be arguing here that James was much more ambivalent
(indeed,  even skeptical)  about absolute truth than Putnam allows,  and that  James’s
departure from Peirce (and Putnam) was often more radical that Putnam suggests. 
5 Of course, most philosophers don’t see such an ambiguity in the word “truth.” On the
contrary, they assume that we already have two words that pick out what James calls
“temporary  belief”  and  “ultimate  truth,”  namely  “belief”  and  “truth.”  The
“unfortunate”  thing,  according  to  such  philosophers,  is  not  that  “truth”  is  used
ambiguously in English, but rather that James uses the normally unambiguous word in
such  an  ambiguous  fashion.8 However,  James’s  position  comes  from  his  treating  a
theory of truth as starting with those things that are taken to be true (the “temporary
truths”), and generalizing from those to get an account of the meaning of “truth” (at
least in its “temporary” sense).9 This is just a general instance of James’s “method of
attacking problems by asking what their terms are ‘known as’.”10 He thinks that looking
at our actual use of even a conceptually central terms like “true” can lead us to insights
about it that mere a priori reflection on the concept cannot.
6 That said, even if James is entitled to suppose that there are two uses of “true,” it can
be very hard to tell which of the two types of truth he is talking about at any given
point. Putnam claims that “James quite freely equates ‘true’ and ‘absolutely true’; it is
‘half-true’ that always takes the qualifier.”11 However, an examination of James’s talk of
truth doesn’t  really  bear  this  out.  So,  for  instance,  when James writes  about  belief
revision he freely switches from the “previous mass of opinions” to the “older stock of
truths,” and claims that “the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of
our truths” (James 1975 [1907]: 34). He clearly seems to have temporary truths in mind
here, since the incompatibility that produces such enmity between truths cannot exist
among absolute truths. In much the same way, his claim that “we have to live today by
what truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call if falsehood” (ibid.: 107)
seems to require that “truth” be read as temporary rather than absolute, especially
since  the  examples  he  gives  right  after  (Ptolemaic  astronomy,  Euclidian  space,
Aristotelian logic,  Scholastic  metaphysics)  are  all  examples  of  temporary truths  for
James.
7 Indeed, when he introduces the distinction between temporary and absolute truth in
his 1908 seminar, temporary truths clearly seem to be his primary interest:
But what is the use of talking about ultimate truth? It is such a purely abstract ideal
that  it  only  serves  as  a  vanishing  point.  The  only  truths  that  men  ever  have
anything practical to do with are those truths that they severally believe in, at any
given time.  Therefore,  so far  as  pragmatism pretends to be a  useful  doctrine it
establishes its utility far more by applying itself to the truths that concern us than
it would by applying itself to an abstract ideal. (James 1988 [1908]: 434-5)
8 There are,  of  course,  bare uses of  “true” in James that seem more in line with the
absolute reading as well, and one reason for the seemingly negligent way James has of
flagging which type of truth he is talking about may be his view that “The pragmatist
definition of truth applies to both” (ibid.: 434).12 James may feel that there is no need to
disambiguate his truth talk, since much of what he says is meant to work equally well
on both readings. However, if James really thinks that “truth” is ambiguous, how could
he claim that the same definition applies to both uses of the term?
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9 Well, while James does take there to be two uses of “true,” he certainly does not take
the two meanings are completely independent of each other. In particular, his claim
that the definition applies to both meanings of “true” in spite of the fact that these are
different meanings can be explained by the fact that “absolute” truth is an idealization of
our “temporary” truths.13 That is, it is what we get if we indefinitely extend the norms
that govern our movements from one temporary “truth” to another.
10 The respective roles of absolute truth and temporary truth would thus be very much
like  those  traditionally  seen  between  truth  and  belief,  but  absolute  truth  and
temporary truth are not independent of each other in the way that belief and truth
were traditionally taken to be. Constraints that determine our temporary truths are
still there when we idealize, and so “subjective” factors that contribute to temporary
truth can still be there when we get to absolute truths.14 
11 Indeed,  as  Putnam  notes, one  thing  that  distinguishes  James’s  pragmatism  from
Peirce’s is that James’s account of truth combines a broadly Peircean conception of the
connection between truth and inquiry with “the un-Peircean idea that truth is partly
shaped by our interests” (Putnam 2017 [1987]: 167-8). For James, if absolute truth just
comes  from  the  continuous  reapplication  of  the  norms  governing  our  temporary
truths, then different conceptions of those norms will result in different conceptions of
what will make up absolute truth as well.
12 This is partially because James takes the process of inquiry to ultimately determine the
referents of the expressions involved (rather than just determining the truth-value of
independently  meaningful  propositions),  and it  is  their  constitutive  contribution to
what our expressions mean that allows our subjective preferences to contribute to even
the “absolute” truth of our thoughts and utterances.15
13 For  instance,  while  the  evidence  can  make  it  clear  that  two  of  our  commitments
conflict, it may not tell us which of the two should be given up, and it is often subjective
factors that will do this later job. These subjective factors thus ultimately determine
whether the term has an extension in line with one commitment or the other (and thus
which sets of commitments have the potential to be ‘absolutely’ true). So, for example,
while the evidence may determine that the belief that whales are fish conflicts with the
belief that “fish” picks out a natural kind, the evidence doesn’t settle whether it  is
“whales are fish” or “fish are a natural kind” that needs to go. We chose to give up the
former, but inquirers with different sets of subjective interests might have given up the
latter leading “fish” to be a functional/commercial kind instead, and making “whales
are fish” absolutely true.
14 In many philosophical cases (such as, say, “freedom” or “knowledge”) we see a similar
tension between the conditions in which the term is actually applied and the general
assumptions we make relating to  it,  and in such cases  which of  the two we would
ultimately give up may be determined in part by our subjective interests. If James is
right, it will turn out that we may face precisely such a choice with the term “truth” as
well.
15 But even if subjective factors contribute to what is ultimately “absolutely” true, why
shouldn’t  we  still  simply  (as  Putnam  suggests)  tie  the  word  “true”  to  the  ideal
associated with it? (Especially given that it is an ideal that we are very attached to.)
This  question  leads  to  a  major  difference  between  the  Jamesian  and  the  standard
“intellectualist”  position,  which  ties  us  back  to  the  earlier  point  that  while  the
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intellectualists  think of  truth as  something out  there  waiting to  be  discovered,  for
James “the absolute truth will  have to be made.”16 In particular,  while we certainly
succeed in making our temporary truths, there will be no guarantee that we can make
absolute truths, and thus no way of being certain that any of our claims are (absolutely)
true or false. This brings a degree of fallibilism about the existence of absolute truth that
isn’t  as  visible on most accounts.  Indeed,  James at  times seems to display not only
fallibilism,  but  also  a  good deal  of  pessimism about  the  existence of  absolute  truth.
Remember  that  in  our  initial  quotation  from  James’s  1908  seminar,  he  described
absolute  truth  as  “a  purely  abstract  thing  that  nobody  may,  perhaps,  ever  be  in
possession of,” and famously claims that it “runs on all fours with the perfectly wise
man,  and  with  the  absolutely  complete  experience;  and,  if  these  ideals  are  ever
realized, they will all be realized together.”17 It often isn’t sufficiently stressed just how
pessimistic a thing this is to say. The perfectly wise man and the absolutely complete
experience are ideals we do not expect to ever be realized, and if absolute truth needs to
be realized with these two if it is to be realized at all, then we can be quite confident
that no claim of ours will ever be “absolutely” true.
16 So why would James be skeptical of absolute truth in this way? Putnam considers two
interrelated sources for James’s skepticism about absolute truth, (1) his “nominalism,”
and (2) his conception of absolute truth as a unified whole, but argues that neither are
enough justify the Rorty/Lamberth reading where James sees absolute truth as just an
ideal.
17 The  first  of  these  is  James’s  purported  unwillingness  to understand  the  relation
between  absolute  truth  and  inquiry  in  counterfactual  terms.  Peirce  originally
characterized truth in “How to make our ideas clear” as “The opinion which is fated to
be  ultimately  agreed  to  by  all  who  investigate”  (Peirce  1992  [1878]:  139),  but  he
famously moved from an indicative to a subjunctive understanding of the conditional
involved in the pragmatist connection between truth and inquiry. He thus moves his
theory to a focus on how extended inquiry would rather than will go,18 but he took James
to have a “nominalistic” commitment to staying with the indicative conditional on this
matter. Putnam agrees that James would be unwilling to modify his account of truth in
this way,19 but while it may be the case that James is more wary of bare possibilities
than Peirce,20 one should not overstate this difference. While James does often tie truth
to actual verification, he also insists that the “workings” by which we understand truth
can be “actual or possible” (James 1975 [1909]: 7), and that most of our truths stay at the
more “virtual” stage. For James, verifiability “is as good as verification” and “[i]ndirectly
or  only  potentially  verifying  processes  may  thus  be  true  as  well  as  full  verification-
processes” (James 1975 [1907]: 99, 100). Consequently, even if James isn’t simply willing
to  adopt  Peirce’s  robustly  realistic  attitude  towards  possibilities,  he  could  still
understand absolute truth in something more like Peirce’s “subjunctive” sense, where
something is “virtually” absolutely true if it is what we would settle on if inquiry went
to its ideal limit. 
18 Another reason why one might think that James could be skeptical about absolute truth
is that he often seemed to think of it as being unified in a particular way.21 That is, if we
only get absolute truth when we have reached the end of inquiry for every question,
then we might think that  we will  never have it.22 James’s  talk  of  absolute truth as
running on all fours with the perfectly wise man and absolutely complete experience
might encourage this interpretation, and Lamberth certainly takes it as one of the main
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reasons for thinking that James was skeptical about absolute truth.23 On this reading,
when James talks of his account of truth being “an account of truths in the plural”
(James 1975 [1907]: 104), these must be temporary truths, since absolute truth is always
“one.” Putnam, however, notes that there are some occasions where James seems to
talk about individual claims or theories being absolutely true,24 and while Peirce’s own
conception of truth has often been understood in terms of something like a global end
of  inquiry,  it  can  also  be  understood  in  a  more  “piecemeal”  fashion,  so  that  an
individual belief would be absolutely true if no amount of further inquiry would lead us
to revise it.25 Such an account would allow one to understand the truth of individual
sentences on their own without any need to presuppose any “global” end of inquiry
where all  questions were settled.  Thus,  according to  Putnam, even if  James has  an
indicative understanding of the relation between truth and inquiry, he does not need to
be a skeptic about absolute truth, because there are many questions for which we have
reached the end of inquiry (that is to say, further investigation will not change our
current answers to those questions).
19 However, James has another reason for his skepticism which Putnam does not address.
In particular, even the non-nominalistic and piecemeal conception of absolute truth
requires that there to be answers that we would converge on were we to investigate
long enough, and James develops a picture of conceptualization and inquiry in which
we have reason to doubt even the possibility of such long term convergence. 
20 This pessimism is related to, and perhaps an extension of, the instrumentalism about
scientific  theories  that  James  discusses  in  Pragmatism  and  The  Meaning  of  Truth.
According  to  James,  the  practitioners  of  the  sciences  of  his  day  didn’t  take  their
theories  to  be  literally true  in  the  sense  of  capturing  the  structure  that  the  world
objectively has. As he puts it:
Up until about 1850 almost everyone believed that the sciences expressed truths
that  were  exact  copies  of  a  definite  code  of  non-human  realities.  But  the
enormously rapid multiplication of theories in these later days has well-nigh upset
the notion of any one of them being a more literally objective kind of thing than
another.  There  are  so  many  geometries,  so  many  logics,  so  many  physical  and
chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each of them good for so much and yet
not good for everything, that the notion that even the truest formula may be a human
device and not a literal transcript has dawned on us. We hear scientific laws treated
as so much “conceptual shorthand,” true so far as they are useful but no further.
(James 1975 [1909]: 40; italics mine)26
21 It is important to note that this instrumentalism is not driven by the fact that we are
faced with,  say,  empirically  equivalent but ontologically  divergent theories (that  is,
multiple theories that would all be equally true in the above Peircean sense of standing
up to indefinite inquiry). Rather, we are faced with a plurality of theories each of which
copes well with some parts of experience, but none of which can be made to fit with all
of it (that is, none of which are candidates for absolute truth). James generalizes this
instrumentalism about scientific truth to truth tout court, when he argues:
It  is  to  be  doubted whether  any  theorizer  to-day,  either  in  mathematics,  logic,
physics or biology, conceives himself to be literally re-editing processes of nature
or thoughts of God […]. The suspicion is in the air nowadays that the superiority of
one of our formulas to another may not consist so much in its literal “objectivity,”
as in subjective qualities like its usefulness, its “elegance” or its congruity with our
residual  beliefs.  Yielding  to  these  suspicions,  and  generalizing,  we  fall  into
something  like  the  humanistic  state  of  mind.  Truth  we  conceive  to  mean
everywhere not duplication, but addition; not the constructing of inner copies or
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already complete realities; but rather the collaborating with realities so as to bring
about a clearer result. (James 1975 [1909]: 41)
22 Further, the problem that James saw with the competing scientific theories (“each of
them good for so much and yet not good for everything”) is seen by him as arising with
our conceptual schemes at large. 
There are thus at least three well-characterized levels, stages or types of thought
about the world we live in, and the notions of one stage have one kind of merit,
those of another stage another kind. It is impossible, however, to say that any stage
as yet in sight is absolutely more true than any other. […] Their naturalness, their
intellectual economy, their fruitfulness for practice, all start up as distinct tests of
their  veracity,  and as a result  we get confused.  Common sense is  better for one
sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but whether
either be truer absolutely, Heaven only knows. (James 1975 [1907]: 92-3)
23 Note that the quotation above ends with the question of whether any of the competing
schemes are truer absolutely, not of which one is.27 Inquiry into a question may never
produce a stable answer, since there may be no stable framework for inquiry, and when
we adopt, say, a scientific framework, many claims that were previously endorsed will
be  denied  because  their  ontological  presuppositions  will  be  rejected  (so  even  a
“piecemeal” truth like “There is a chair in my office” will turn out not to be absolutely
true, because in some contexts we will be working with a conceptual framework where
there are not “commonsense” objects like chairs at all). If we are stuck moving between
such “incomplete” conceptual schemes, our claims will end up being, as James put it
above, only “relatively true, or true within those borders of experience” (James 1975
[1907]: 107).
24 Of course, one might think that this is only a temporary state, and that we should expect
that eventually we would be able to find a single conceptual system in which we can
explain everything.  However,  James seems at  times pessimistic  about the status  quo
changing,  and  his  reasons  for  being  so  become  clearer  in  the  series  of  lecture  he
delivered  a  year  after  Pragmatism,  lectures  subsequently  collected  as  A  Pluralistic
Universe.  In  that  book  (as  well  as  his  posthumously  published  Some  Problems  of
Philosophy), James presents a picture of how our concepts work that might lead one to
doubt that any claim that made use of them could ever turn out to be “absolutely” true.
28
25 According to James, concepts emerged “in the interests of practice essentially and only
subordinately  in  the  interests  of  theory,”29 and  our  most  fundamental  concepts 30
evolved  to  serve  the  most  basic  of  these  ends.  However,  a  conceptual  system that
emerged this way may not be well suited to provide the kind of consistent theoretical
account of reality that absolute truth requires. Indeed, James’s infamous rejection of
the “logic of identity” in A Pluralistic Universe is best understood as a rejection not so
much of logic itself, but of the assumption that the inferential structure of our basic
concepts matches the structure of reality at a more “global” level. 
26 James argues that, if extended beyond the practical contexts in which they emerged,
our concepts can eventually misrepresent the realities they normally help us cope with,
and this problem is not limited to the concepts of common sense.31 James seems to
suspect that it  will  be a problem with any conceptual system, since conceptualization
itself  misrepresents the “continuous” nature of reality.32 Concepts (at  least as James
understands them) require sharp boundaries, and while the imposition of models of the
world where things are sharply defined has tremendous practical value, James takes it
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to inevitably misrepresent the richness of reality, and thus such models may be unable
to get to a point of absolute truth. The pinch will always be felt, and thus no stable rest
to inquiry will ever be reached. 
27 In this sense, James understates just how radical his pluralism is when he writes to
Dickenson Miller that
The world per se may be likened to a cast of beans upon a table. By themselves they
spell nothing. An onlooker may group them as he likes. He may simply count them
all and map them. He may select groups and name these capriciously, or name them
to suit  certain extrinsic  purposes  of  his.  Whatever  he does,  so  long as  he  takes
account of them, his account is neither false nor irrelevant. If neither, why not call it
true? (Letter to D. S. Miller, Aug. 5, 1907, quoted in James 1920, vol. 2: 295-6)
28 Putnam quotes  this  passage  approvingly,33 but  there  is  a  serious  problem with  the
metaphor, one that becomes clear when Putnam starts to explain it with the claim that
“the ‘beans’ are bits of pure experience.”34 The cast of beans certainly does represent
experience, but for James, experience is expressly not broken up into “bits” at all, and
its continuous nature is something that he consistently stressed from his critiques of
the atomistic nature of associationist psychology in his Principles of Psychology (James
1981 [1890]), to his last writings on percepts and concepts (James 1979 [1911]).
29 Putnam credits James with being the “first post-cartesian philosopher to completely
reject the idea the perception requires intermediaries,”35 but this divergence between
percepts and concepts, with the former being continuous and the latter discrete, is one
reason why James would have trouble extending the sort of “direct realism” that he has
about the perceptual realm to the conceptual. Putnam sees James’s failure to do so as
mistake, and thinks that just as “James decisively rejected the interface conception of
perception”  (Putnam  2017  [1987]:  186-7),  he  should  have  posited  a  more  “direct”
connection between conception and reality. However, James takes percepts and reality
to both have a “continuous” structure, so the identification of the two makes sense for
James, but since he sees concepts as having a completely different sort of (“discrete”)
structure, the identification is much harder to make.
30 It  is  thus  not  surprising  that  James,  unlike  Peirce,  draws a  fairly  sharp distinction
between truth and reality.36 This gives us reason to doubt Putnam’s claim that absolute
truth has an “explanatory” role for James in that a belief’s being absolutely true is often
the best explanation for it being temporarily true. According to Putnam, the fact that it
is (absolutely) true that, say, Franklin Roosevelt was president of the United States in
1940 is no different from the fact that Franklin Roosevelt was president of the United
States in 1940, and that fact is the best explanation of all the evidence we have that he
was, evidence which in turn explains why we believe that he was (and thus why the
belief that he was president in 1940 is temporarily true).37 Now it may be the case that if
reality really can be broken up into “facts” that mirror the structure of our concepts,
then those facts (and the absolute truths that express them) would best explain why
many of our beliefs are warranted. However, it is just this conception of reality that
James questions in his later work, and while a belief of our’s may be warranted because
it fits reality better than any other, that “fit” may still not be tight enough for what it is
fitting to be considered a fact that makes it “absolutely” true.
31 So what should we say if  the “pessimistic” conclusion that James imagines actually
turned out to be the case, and the regulative ideal that our use of “true” aspired to was
unsatisfiable?38 Of course it would then follow that nothing was “absolutely” true, but it
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seems less clear that we should conclude that nothing was true. After all, we should,
with James, consider the possibility that the failure of absolute truth should lead us
instead to conclude that the “absolute” interpretation is not the best account of what
we mean by “true.”39 
32 “True”  may  be  on  James’s  picture,  a  term like  “saint.”  That  term has,  arguably,  a
“strong”  reading  (roughly,  a  holy  person  who  is  now  part  of  “the  great  cloud  of
witnesses up in heaven,” (Hebrews 12:1)) and a “weak” reading (roughly, someone who
is canonized by the Catholic church). Those who think that there actually is a cloud of
witnesses up in heaven will be inclined to favor the strong reading of the term. For
them, canonization is meant to recognize sainthood, not constitute it, so someone could
be a saint but fail to be canonized, and vice versa. On the other hand, those of us who
come to believe that there isn’t any heaven at all can either adopt the weaker reading
where canonization is constitutive of sainthood, or hold on to the strong reading, and
just conclude that there aren’t any saints. The decision we make may be determined by
our practical interests, particularly those relating to whether or not “saint-talk” would
still have any useful role in our lives even if the strong reading were insupportable.
33 In the pessimistic scenario where absolute truth is unattainable, much the same can be
said for “true.” It may be, ultimately, subjective factors that would determine whether
we give up on the existence of truth altogether.  Some might feel  that the absolute
conception is so central to our notion of truth that if there were no absolute truth then
we should say that there is no truth at all. Indeed, Peirce seems committed to a position
something like this when he claims, “I do not say that it is infallibly true that there is
any belief to which a person would come if he were to carry his inquiries far enough. I
only say that that alone is what I call Truth. I cannot infallibly know that there is any
truth.”40 Others might feel that truth-talk is central enough for us that if the ideal of
absolute truth proved to be unrealizable, then we would simply need to understand
“truth”  in  a  way  that  doesn’t  make  absolutist  presupposition.  I  think that  James’s
willingness to understand truth as “temporary truth” puts him firmly in this latter
camp. If you think that absolute truth is a realizable ideal, then it will be natural to
think that temporary truth is a pretty shabby candidate for what most of us mean by
“true.” However, if, like James, you think that this ideal may fail to be realized, even in
principle, then the shabby candidate can begin to look like what we really have been
talking about with the term all along. (In this sense, true might be like “free,” where
the concept is so central to our practices that we might not want to take on any sort of
error theory about its application).41
34 Given Putnam and Rorty’s extended debate about just “how far” pragmatism should go,
42 it is unsurprising that Putnam would like to argue that both of Pragmatism’s fathers
were on his side, and while I’ve argued here that James’s writings about absolute truth
hardly put him in Putnam’s camp, James’s position still isn’t quite as radical as Rorty’s
suggestion that absolute truth is just an ideal. For James, it is still an empirical question
whether inquiry could develop in a way that leads to absolute truth. While he may have
presented some reasons for doubting that this sort of consensus can be reached, those
considerations are hardly conclusive,  and if  it  did turn out that absolute truth was
attainable, it would be natural for that to be the primary way to understand what truth
was. Putnam ultimately claims that James takes his account of truth to be a hypothesis,43
and I would argue that both the absolute and temporary readings of truth are very
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much “live” hypotheses for James.44 How inquiry will ultimately pan out, and thus how
truth should ultimately be understood, is something for future inquiries to decide.
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NOTES
1. This narrative is especially clear in Mounce 1997, and Misak 2013, and see Rorty 1979, 1982,
1991 [1986],  and  Putnam  1981,  1995  for  reasons  why  those  two  are  often  viewed  as  the
contemporary exemplars of these two forms.
2. For the most part, I’ll be sticking with “temporary” and “absolute” in what follows. 
3. James (1988 [1908]: 433). (For more on James’s talk of the “ambiguity” of truth, see also James
(1976 [1904]: 13; 1975 [1907]: 94, and 1975 [1909]: 100.)
4. See Rorty (1991 [1986]: 128). Something like Rorty’s view of the role of absolute truth in James
is aptly defended in Lamberth 1999, 2005.
5. See Putnam 1987, 2005. 
6. See the discussion of James (1975 [1909]: 143) in Putnam (2017 [1987]: 173), and Putnam (2017
[2005]: 195-6).
7. Putnam (2017 [2005]: 200). 
8. For an early instance of this complaint, see Russell (1910: 111).
9. See, for instance, James (1975 [1907]: 34, 36-7), and James (1975 [1909]: 132). 
10. James (2004: 400). 
11. Putnam (2017 [1987]: 185).
12. See also James (1975 [1909]: 100). 
13. And one should note (with Putnam 2017 [1987]: 173) that James’s talk of “definitions” here is
pretty impressionistic, and what he is offering is more of a “theory” or “account” of truth than a
definition.
14. See, for instance, “The Sentiment of Rationality” in James (1979 [1897]).
15. For a discussion of this, see Jackman 1998. 
16. James (1975 [1907]: 107). 
17. James (1975 [1907]: 107).
18. Referring to his earlier indicative understanding of it as being a “grievous error” (Misak 2016:
14). 
19. Putnam (2017 [1987]: 181). 
20. As  Putnam  puts  it,  “James’s  ‘radical  empiricism’  has  no  room  for  Peirce’s  ‘Thirdness’”
(Putnam 2017 [1987]: 182).
21. An assumption that would have seemed more natural in James’s time as the influence of the
sort of “Absolute Idealism” associated with philosophers like James’s colleague Royce (1885) was
then at its peak.
22. Indeed, it has been suggested that formal reasons relating to Gödel’s incompleteness proof
entail that such a “global” resolution of every question isn’t even in principle possible (see, for
instance, Johnston 1993).
23. Lamberth (1999: 218; 2005: 228).
24. See particularly Putnam (2017 [1987]: 173; 2017 [2005]: 193, 199 n.29), where he talks about
James’s claim that his own theory of truth is absolutely true. (Putnam is here referring to James
(1975 [1909]: 142),  and as Lamberth (2005: 229) notes, the passage in question is not quite as
ringing of an endorsement of the claim as Putnam might have us believe.)
25. Peircian  truth  thus  comes  out  as  something  closer  to  Crispin  Wright’s  notion  of
“superassertability”  (Wright  1992,  2001).  Misak  (1991,  2013)  argues  that  this  his  how  Peirce
himself ultimately understood his notion of truth.
26. See also James (1975 [1907]: 103). 
27. In this respect, I think that Levine 2013 understates how radical James’s views in this area are
by suggesting that they amount to just a “conceptual pluralism” resting on the fact that “the
sensory flux tolerates multiple ways of being taken up” (2013: §18).
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28. These consequences are given a more prominent place in these later works, but the basic
picture of concepts that they rest on goes back to James’s The Principles of Psychology (1890).
29. James (1970 [1909]: 109). See also James (1970 [1909]: 96-7), James (1988 [1908]: 438).
30. For instance, those concepts discussed in Pragmatism’s chapter on “Common Sense” such as
“space,” “time,” “thing” and “cause.”
31. Indeed, one might think this about the concept of truth itself, and that worries about the liar
paradox give us similar reasons for thinking that, strictly speaking, nothing could be absolutely
either true or false (see Scharp 2013).
32. For further discussion, see Jackman 2018.
33. Putnam (2017 [2005]: 191).
34. Putnam (2017 [2005]: 192). Note that Putnam is in some sense aware of this, as seen in his
discussion of precisely this issue in Putnam & Putnam (2017 [1996]: 163).
35. Putnam (2017 [1987]: 176), see also Putnam 1996, 2001.
36. See, for instance, James (1975 [1909]: 106-7), and for a discussion of the relevance of this
aspect of James’s thought, see Lamberth (1999: 220-1; 2005: 224).
37. Putnam (2017 [2005]: 200). 
38. I  should  note  here  that  while  some  have  questioned  whether  James  could  endorse  the
possibility of  complete skepticism about absolute truth because he writes “‘There is  absolute
truth’ is the only absolute truth of which we can be sure” (James 1975 [1909]: 143), that claim
isn’t actually something that James says himself. Rather it is only something that he puts in the
mouth of “the better absolutists,” so one shouldn’t read too much into it as an expression of
James’s own views. 
39. This won’t take away from the importance of absolute truth as an ideal that regulates our
behavior,  and  as  James  notes,  no  one  “who  ever  actually  walked  the  earth  has  denied  the
regulative character in his own thinking of the notion of absolute truth” (James 1975 [1909]: 143);
it is just to suggest that this regulative role can be played even if the ideal is never realized.
40. Peirce (1958 [1908]: 398).
41. See Strawson 1962. 
42. See, for instance, Putnam 1981, Rorty 1998.
43. Putnam (2017 [2005]: 194). 
44. For James’s conception of a “live” hypotheses, see James (1979 [1897]: 14).
ABSTRACTS
While historians of pragmatism often present William James as the founder of the “subjectivist”
wing of pragmatism that came back into prominence with the writings of Richard Rorty, Hilary
Putnam has argued that James’s views are actually much closer to Peirce’s (and Putnam’s own).
Putnam does so by noting that James distinguishes two sorts of truth: “temporary truth,” which
is closer to a subjective notion of warranted assertibility, and “absolute truth,” which is closer to
Peirce’s own comparatively objective notion of truth as what would be believed at some idealized
end of inquiry. Putnam then argues that the temptation to read James as a precursor to Rorty
requires privileging his talk of temporary truth, when, in fact, it was always absolute truth that
was the primary sense of the term for James. This paper will argue that James’s views on truth
are, in fact, much less tied to the absolute notion than Putnam suggests, and, indeed, that James’s
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account of the relations between our concepts and reality leave open the possibility that no claim
of ours could ever be “absolutely” true, and thus that “temporary” truth would be all we could
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